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THE BATTLE OF HAMICH RIDGE
16-25 November 1944
2d Bn., 47th Inf., 9th Division

Interview with Lt. Col. Lewis E. Maness, CO, 2d Bn., 47th Inf.

Place: RAGUHN, Germany.

Date: 14 May 1945

Maps Used: Germany, 1:25,000, Sheets 5203 (STOLBERG), 5103
(ESCHWEILER), 5104 (DUREN)

OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY ACCOUNTS OF 1-2-3 ~~47~~¹¹

Journals not used; after-action report of 47th Inf. used to check dates.

Interviewer: Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler, 2d Info & Hist. Sv.

At the start of the operation, on 16 November, the 2d Bn. was in position $\frac{1}{2}$ mile southwest of SCHEVENHUTTE (005420). The companies were all ~~not~~ quite up to strength-- about 140-150 men per company-- but this had no tactical effect upon their performance. Companies were habitually rotated, in order to give them sufficient rest in reserve.

The terrain for the operation was flat and open, with only a few small hills which allowed a man to get in defilade if close enough to the ground, to avoid ~~xxxxxx~~ small arms fire. The ground was good for the operation of tanks, with the exception of several boggy spots, notably to the left of the road into HUCHELN (000475). Open beet fields were the chief characteristic of the ground over which the 2d Bn. operated. Most of the action occurred between two parallel sets of railroad tracks in a 500-yard wide strip of ground running generally east and northeast in an area south of ESCHWEILER and WEISWEILER as far east as LANGERWEHE.

All of this territory was under enemy observation. "And he could hit the rails at any spot with his artillery," added

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Col. Maness.

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On D-Day, 16 November, the 2d Bn. marched to the positions on the southern and eastern edges of KREWINKEL (980410) vacated by the 1st Bn. when the latter attacked GRESSENICH. Only a small amount of artillery was received, and these moves were completed on 17 November. The following day, enemy air was active, and strafing planes riddled the kitchen equipment of G Co. with anti-personnel bombs, but caused no casualties.

For the next few days until 23 November, the 2d Bn. remained in regimental reserve in the same positions. On that day, the battalion moved north through GRESSENICH, HASTENRATH (975446), VOLKENRATH (977454) and BOHL (974456), then cut northeast to NOTHBERG (980460). The move started at 0500, and the battalion received no opposition until approximately daylight when, upon entering NOTHBERG, the enemy apparently observed the troops coming in and delivered several artillery concentrations ~~on~~ which interdicted key crossroads in town. The move was made in a column of companies, with the tanks and TDs following behind the riflemen.

On 24 November, the 2d Bn. attacked at 1000 between the two railroad tracks, with HUCHELN the objective. The plan contemplated that elements of the 3d Armored Division attack in this direction at 1300 should the 2d Bn. be unable to reach HUCHELN. The railroad tracks on the south side of the battalion sector of advance were built up slightly; those on the north side were low and level. Neither furnished any protection, but were invitations for enemy observation coming from high ground in the town of HUCHELN

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and a high slag-pile at (998482). On the ground which the 2d Bn. had to cover, there was a gentle slope from right down to left (south to north).

Instructions from higher headquarters specified that the battalion stop and dig in if the resistance was too heavy.

"I don't want you to get involved in a big fight; keep casualties down," were regiment's instructions to Col. Maness. Col. Maness noted that "you can't dig in and get protection in an open field."

The battalion sent out several patrols along the right railroad tracks and between the left railroad tracks and the road which bisects the battalion sector, but the patrols spotted nothing and there was no indications of the numbers, disposition and defenses of the enemy prior to the jumpoff.

The 81mm mortars fired from NOTHBERG, and TDs delivered supporting fire for the attack from a small rise in NOTHBERG. 8 heavy machine guns were also set up to fire from NOTHBERG. A ten-minute artillery preparation was placed on HUCHELN, and as this lifted 300 rounds of 81mm mortar ~~and~~ HE and 100 rounds of smoke on the area of advance were to precede the attack.

Col. Maness says that he would ^{have} executed the attack differently if he had known more about the enemy defenses. No aerial photographs were available in advance of the operation, but Col. Maness states that an aerial he subsequently saw in the possession of the 3d Armored Division showed clearly where the enemy defenses were located; it also indicated that the enemy

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positions had been misjudged by about 400 yards and that most of the supporting fire had dropped beyond ^{his} ~~their~~ main entrenchments.

The enemy had constructed a powerfully-manned system of zigzag trenches between the two sets of railroad tracks. He was using a good grade of fighting troops from the 12th Division, with a few paratroopers mixed in. None of them appeared to be trigger-happy, and they were well-disciplined, allowing the 2d Bn. men to advance to within 40 yards before opening fire. As a result, the first five men in F Co. were killed at the first burst of enemy fire.

The battalion advanced with companies abreast, with one on each side of the road which cuts through the center of the sector. Attached tanks fired into what they thought were enemy positions, but could not use their machine guns very effectively when not right up with the infantry at points where ~~the~~ the infantry could designate targets. The tanks did an effective piece of work on a red house at (996470) which the enemy was using as an OP; at one point in the operation, eight men were observed to enter the house, and after the tanks finished working it over, one German crawled out.

One enemy tank at the railroad junction south of the slagpile (999478) caused our advancing infantry a great deal of woe until the fields across which the infantry was advancing were effectively smoked with the 81mm mortars.

Problems of battalion-company communication complicated the battle for HUCHELN. Although Col. Maness, in his forward OP in

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the last house on the eastern edge of NOTHBERG, was only 500-600 yards from his troops, he could not get to them nor their company commanders back to him. Artillery knocked out ~~their~~ F Co's SCR 300's and the E Co. Commander was pinned in his hole by artillery fire. Col. Maness sent the company executive officers, Lt. Lawrence J. McLaughlin of F Co., and Lt. Harry W. Kenny of E Co. forward to reestablish contact. The company executive officers had been with Col. Maness in the forward battalion O.P.

At 1430, a battalion of tanks from the 3d Armored Division arrived in NOTHBERG. It was then planned to push the tanks down the main road toward HUCHELN up to the outskirts, then have them deploy and enter the town from all sides, with the infantry following to clean out the town. The plan was then for the tanks to push through WILHELMSHOHE and northeast toward LANGERWEHE, with a company of infantry mounting a company of tanks to take FRENZERBURG castle.

The advance into HUCHELN was slowed by minefields in the road and on both sides of the road, and continued strong resistance from enemy dug in around the built-up area, and from the woods southeast of HUCHELN. Marshy ground to the left of the ~~ground~~ road bogged down several of the tanks; one was hit by a mine and burned south of HUCHELN. Several self-propelled guns firing from the north railroad tracks were knocked out by the ~~the~~ tanks, but because of the mines and bad ground only one company of mediums could actually enter HUCHELN. This they did shortly after dark and the town was cleared by 2100 after house-to-house fighting.

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The town was actually entered by F Co. pushing into the left edge, and then E Co. entering the same way through F Co's sector. Over 100 PWs were captured in HUCHELN.

"Had I known that the enemy was dug in so well in that area," commented Col. Maness, "I would not have disposed my companies abreast during the attack, but rather would have used a column of companies and then sent one on a right hook through BOVENBERG through the 3d Bn's sector."

At a company commanders' meeting in HUCHELN on the night of the 24th, Col. Maness outlined the plan of an advance for the following day: G Co., up until then the reserve company, would pass through F and become the left assault company, F reverting to reserve and E remaining the right assault company. G Co. was assigned to clear the built-up factory areas in WILHELMSHOHE, while E was to cross open ground along the main road to LANGERWEHE.

In preparation for the next day's attack, the tankers winched their bogged-down vehicles out of the marsh and the engineers cleared for mines all around and out of HUCHELN. Col. Maness told the tank task force commander that he would clean the factory area as far as the LANGERWEHE road, because panzerfausts in the factory buildings were a particular menace to the advancing tanks.

The battalion attacked at 0830 on 25 November. G Co. received a great deal of self-propelled gunfire on the left flank while pushing toward the road running south from WEISWEILER. E Co., on the right, was engaged in house-to-house fighting in order to break out to the open ground.

"WILHELMSHOHE took practically all day to clear,"

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
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said Col. Maness. "At 1400 the brass were on me to get moving, so I pushed E Co. onto an open field beyond WILHELMSHOHE." Intense mortar and artillery fire greeted E Co. in the field, and three accompanying tanks of the 3d Armored Division were knocked out. Cross-fire from machine guns, tanks and anti-tank guns soon pinned down the troops attempting to cross this area, and E Co. suffered 10 killed and 15 wounded. The area was smoked to enable E Co. to pull back to the protection of buildings in WILHELMSHOHE, and F Co. was then committed around the left flank of the battalion sector. That night the battalion pushed out as far as IMMUNTERN (005483).

At the end of the day on 25 November, E Co. was down to 35 effective fighting men, and the company was in such bad shape that they could be used for little more than a CP guard. Therefore, Col. Maness requested additional troops for the next day's mission, which was to seize the FRENZERBURG castle. (See separate account of the fight for the castle, for which K Co. was attached to the 2d Bn.)

Kenneth W. Hechler
maj. Inf.
KENNETH W. HECHLER
Maj., Inf. (Armored)

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FRENZERBURG CASTLE
26-28 November 1944
2d Bn. (with K Co. atchd.),
47th Inf., 9th Div.

Interviews with: Lt. Col. Lewis E. Maness, CO, 2d Bn., 47th Inf.
Capt. William L. McWaters, CO, K Co.

Place: RAGUHN and GR. BADEGAST, Germany. Dates: 14-15 May 1945

Maps Used: Germany, 1:25,000, Sheets 5103 (ESCHWEILER) and 5104 (DUREN),
plus freehand sketches drawn by Col. Maness and Capt. McWaters.

Journals not used; after-action report of 47th Inf. used to check dates.
2 Sketches attached.

Interviewer: Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler, 2d Info & Hist Sv.

FRENZERBURG castle (019489) was the last objective which the 47th Inf. captured between the start of the 16 November offensive and the time the regiment was detached from the 1st Division and pulled out of the line. It commanded the autobahn and the approaches thereto, and was a fanatically-defended enemy strongpoint which prevented further advances toward the Roer River.

On 24 and 25 November, the 2d Bn. had fought until long after dark to clear HUCHELN and WILHELMSHOHE, and the battalion was ~~kia~~ tired and low in strength. Since E Co. was hit the hardest, Col. Maness asked for additional troops for the mission of taking the castle and K Co. was attached. K Co. had also experienced hard fighting in the two days preceding the attack, in reducing enemy resistance at the dairy at SOVENBERG (999469).

The plan of attack for 26 November was for a battalion of tanks from the 3d Armored Division, with Co. F mounting the vehicles, to attack southeast from the IMMUNTERN road toward LANGERWEHE, and then seize the castle from the south. K Co. was to proceed northeast along the railroad track and protect the left flank of the battalion. E Co., supported by two TDs, remained in the vicinity of IMMUNTERN

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and blocked roads in that vicinity.

At 1000 on 26 November, the 2d Bn. and K Co. moved out in a coordinated attack. Two platoons of F Co. were loaded on a company of tanks from the 3d Armored Division, but the tank-infantry force had not advanced more than 100 yards across an open, cultivated field before enemy tank fire or anti-tank guns knocked out two of the leading tanks. A tanker had a leg blown off, but the mounted infantry scattered like confetti and miraculously escaped injury. This incident occurred at (010484); the enemy fire came from a point due west of LUCHEM (037490). Both tanks burned, and the enemy fire was concentrated so heavily in the vicinity that the attack was broken up and the tanks were pulled back around the houses in IMMUNTERN.

Meanwhile K Co. had moved northeast along the railroad tracks to (012489), when the enemy artillery hit them also. "It was the heaviest mortar and artillery fire since El Guettar," described Capt. McWaters. With no cover, in exposed positions along the railroad tracks, and apparently observed from several directions by the enemy, K Co. was in desperate straits. Capt. McWaters looked ~~over~~ due east and saw the towers of FRENZERBURG castle. It looked as though the castle were right in the middle of the woods. Capt. McWaters, figuring he could sneak his company through the woods, decided to try and move there in order to get protection from the heavy artillery and mortar fire. "I jumped off that morning with 80 men; after five minutes under that artillery, I had lost 20 men," said Capt. McWaters.

K Co. moved out from the railroad tracks with the 1st and

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3d platoons abreast. Reaching a small patch of woods which appeared to border the castle, the company surprised a group of enemy who were just setting up their machine guns and captured 20 PWs. To K Co's surprise, it was discovered that the ~~small~~^{150-yard} stretch of woods ended 300 yards from the castle and that the intervening ground was open.

The enemy was shelling the woods, and the company commander was hit; Lt. McWalters then took over the company. With no contact on either flank, out of radio communication, and unable to get smoke which was called for, K Co. moved out of the woods with Lt. Chester Jordan's 3d platoon leading on ~~the~~ right flank. The 1st platoon under Lt. Hubert Urban then attacked on the left flank, and both platoons over-ran a waist-high hedge halfway to the castle. The 2d platoon, and H Co's machine guns, set up a base of fire.

After the company had progressed beyond the hedge, enemy who had concealed themselves and dug in deeply along the east side of the hedge sprang up and attempted to ambush the company. S/Sgt. James W. Searles, platoon sergeant of the 3d platoon, turned in time to see what was happening, shot off a German officer's jaw, and the rest of the 40 men were summarily taken prisoner. The prisoners, along with German wounded and seven American wounded were taken to one of the three outlying buildings which border the main castle structure, under fire from the second-story windows of the castle and sniper fire from north of the buildings.

~~Ex~~ The approach to the castle was guarded by a solidly-built stone gatehouse, surrounded by a water-filled moat twenty feet wide. A drawbridge leading to a barricaded oaken door was the only ~~way~~ approach to the gatehouse. Three U-shaped build-

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ings surrounded a flat, open courtyard facing the gatehouse and drawbridge. Observation from the gatehouse on the courtyard and surrounding buildings was excellent. There was a low, waist-high stone wall which bordered the moat on the courtyard side, affording some protection from the second-story windows of the gatehouse. Only a 10-yard driveway separated the ^{corners of the} gatehouse from the corners of the two buildings closest to the gatehouse.

K Co. was in a decimated condition when it reached the outlying buildings, with a strength of approximately 50 men. Pfc. Carl V. Sheridan, bazooka gunner from K Co., saw his ammunition-bearer wounded in the advance from the woods to the buildings. Sheridan went back ~~and~~ under enemy fire and procured additional bazooka rounds. Covered by two riflemen at the southwest corner of the wall bordering the gatehouse moat, Sheridan worked his way along the wall on the south side of the moat toward the drawbridge. Despite approximately eight enemy grenades thrown from the gatehouse which burst close to him, he fired two rounds from his bazooka, unassisted, at the oaken door. The rounds weakened the door, but it was so heavy that probably Pfc. Sheridan realized he would have to blast off the hinges with his one remaining bazooka round.

By this time grenades, rifle and machine gun fire ~~was~~ were concentrated on Pfc. Sheridan, but he advanced ~~to~~ to an even more exposed point on the drawbridge approach and fired his last bazooka round. After firing this round, Sheridan jumped to his feet and after turning back toward his company with a "Come on, let's get them!" he charged the castle door and was killed within a few feet of the door on the drawbridge. For his exploit he was awarded

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a Medal of Honor. (NOTE: Up to 15 May, this was the only Medal of Honor awarded to anyone in the 9th Division for fighting in the African and European theaters).

Pfc. Sheridan's feat occurred about 1400, but K Co. in its weakened condition was unable to capitalize that day upon what he had ~~done~~ accomplished. Later in the afternoon, the enemy launched a counterattack from the gatehouse and castle, overpowered a squad of K Co. in one of the outlying buildings and recaptured the 40 prisoners which had been taken from along the hedge. The K Co. squad was captured, but the K Co. wounded (including the ex-company commander) were left undisturbed.

Shell fragments had destroyed K Co's SCR 300, and by the end of the day the company was in an even more precarious position. Knowing that he had to get in communication with Col. Maness, Capt. McWaters asked for a volunteer and the platoon sergeant of the 1st platoon, Sgt. Linus Vanderheid went back to contact Col. Maness in his CP in the IMMUNTERN brick factory (005482).

Meanwhile, Col. Maness had been trying desperately to push some help through to K Co. He tried to get some artillery fire placed on the castle, but could not get clearance because of a belief that K Co. was actually in the castle. ^{F and G} ~~The~~ companies were pinned down by an increasing amount of machine gun and mortar fire which the enemy ~~were~~ ^{was} placing on the approach from the woods. To clarify the situation, Col. Maness worked his way out to a pillbox on the west side of the hedge. Looking at the Germans in the castle through a 20-power 'scope, Col. Maness could clearly see their uniforms and insignia. Four tanks were pulled up to the

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edge of the woods, from which they fired into the second-story windows of the castle, and 35 additional PWs were rounded up in the woods.

Waiting until after dark, Col. Maness pushed F and G Cos. across the open ground, supported by three tanks. One tank bogged down in the soggy fields, a second was hit by anti-tank fire from FRENZENBURG and ~~xxxx~~^{set} afire, and the tank commanded by the tank platoon leader was the only one to get through to the castle. As soon as this tank came within range, it was subjected to machine gun and bazooka fire and in the darkness it ran into the moat surrounding the castle. The crew abandoned the tank and all escaped but the platoon leader, who was believed to have been captured.

Unaware that the enemy had launched his counterattack against K Co., Col. Maness sent ~~xxxx~~^{F and G} companies abreast against the west side of the castle. "What I should have done was to have sent one company in a flanking movement around the east side of the castle. As it turned out, the enemy took the opportunity that night to reinforce the castle from the east side with a company of paratroopers." Cos. G and F reached the castle area at about 2100 on 26 November, and Co. G took up positions on the north side of the castle.

At 0400 on 27 November, six enemy tanks and 60 paratroopers launched a counterattack on the outlying buildings and came in from the northeast and southeast. The infantry reached the road immediately to the east of the buildings; two of the tanks were hit by our artillery, but one of them worked its way into the courtyard and roamed around shooting its machine guns until some

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individuals drove it away with grenades. Severe fighting raged, and heavy losses were inflicted on the counterattacking force. The enemy set fire to all the buildings held by the battalion and K Co., and G Co. retaliated by setting the castle on fire. "Fire in one of the haylofts enabled us to keep warm," said Col. Maness, "but it got so hot for one group that they had to tunnel their way out ~~with~~ the south side with a pick and chisel; the enemy had the doorway covered with fire."

After the counterattack had been repulsed on the morning of 27 November, the companies became mixed to such an extent that it was impossible to identify any organized line between F, G and K Cos. Fighting continued all day, with the enemy firing from the second-story windows of the gatehouse, and our troops returning the compliments ~~xxxxxx~~ from windows barely ten yards away. At approximately 1500 on 27 November, the commanding officer of the enemy holding the castle asked for a truce in order to evacuate his more seriously wounded personnel.

A white German ambulance rolled up into the castle courtyard. "Don't let him get away, and if he tries, blow him up with a bazooka," ordered Col. Maness. Col. Smythe, the regimental commander, sent Capt. William Ewald, regimental IPW team chief, to the castle to attempt to negotiate a surrender of the enemy troops. The enemy CO asked to be allowed one more day to think over his decision on this proposal; he was refused this request. Subsequently, 30 severely wounded enemy were evacuated; eight more less seriously wounded were left as our prisoners.

At 1800, after a three-hour truce, the fighting recommenced and raged on until well past midnight of 27-28 November, when the

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firing died down for the remainder of the night. However, white phosphorus shells and WP grenades again set the castle on fire and it burned all night.

The plan of Col. Maness for the next day was to bring up 2 155mm "GPF's" and use them in combination with TDs to level the castle. Three TDs were sent to the castle under the cover of darkness and placed into position for another attack on the morning of 28 November.

At 0800 on the 28th, the three TDs opened up on the castle at close range, and battered the gateway, door, and several machine gun positions covering the entrance. The men threw and fired incendiary grenades into portions of the grounds which could not be reached by direct fire, and also made use of improvised adaptations of 60mm mortar shells fired from M1 rifle grenade launchers. These proved highly effective when they were fired into castle windows and exploded within the rooms.

Shortly before 1100, the castle was assaulted and it was discovered that most of the enemy had pulled out, leaving behind 60 bodies of paratroopers in and around the castle buildings. A considerable number of civilians were also discovered taking shelter in the deep castle cellars.

The survivors from F, G and K Cos. then set up a strong defense from the autobahn south to the open, cultivated fields which stretched away to the east. G and F Cos. held these positions, and K Co. was relieved and sent back to IMMUNTERN preparatory to rejoining the 3d Bn. The enemy continued to direct mortar

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and artillery fire on the castle and outlying buildings, but attempted no further counterattack to recapture any of the ground yielded.

K Co. returned to the 3d Bn. with a total strength of 31 men, having jumped off with the 2d Bn. for the castle with 80 men. Col. Maness estimates that his battalion lost 35 killed and 200 wounded in the fighting for the FRENZERBURG castle. ~~Vast~~ Amounts of enemy equipment were captured; the last assault on the castle on 28 November resulted in the capture of 2 120mm mortars, 4 81mm mortars, 8 light machine guns, and large quantities of rifles, bazookas and ammunition.

Kenneth W. Hechler

KENNETH W. HECHLER
Maj., Inf. (Armored)

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THE BATTLE OF HAMICH RIDGE
16-25 Nov. 1944
3d Bn., 47th Inf., 9th Div.

Interviews with Capt. Gael M. Frazier, CO, L Co., 3d Bn.
Capt. William L. McWaters, CO, K Co., 3d Bn.

Place: GR. BADEGAST, Germany.

Date: 15 May 1945

Maps Used: Germany, 1:25,000, Sheets 5203 (STOLBERG), 5103
(ESCHWEILER), 5104 (DUREN).

OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY ACCOUNTS OF 1-2-3[#] 47
Journals not used; after-action report of 47th Inf. used to check
dates.

Interviewer: Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler, 2d Info & Hist Sv.

In the early part of the coordinated First Army attack commencing 16 November, the 3d Bn./47th played a relatively minor role. On D-day, at 1700, Co. K was ordered to cut the road leading northeast from GRESSENICH (989427) at the point (995433). By this time the 1st Division had pushed through HAMICH (002437) and had troops east of GRESSENICH.

There was no opposition met by K Co. in its 16 November mission, but the terrain was rough and it was getting dark fast. Not until 2215 was the road cut and a road block established to secure it.

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On 17/November, the 3d Bn. maintained their positions, alerted to move on short notice. The plan of attack for 19 November was for the 3d Bn. to move from their positions in the vicinity of SCHEVENHUTTE (005420) and occupy Hill 232 as soon as it was cleared by the 1st Bn. and be prepared to attack and seize BOVENBERG (998468). That day the 1st Bn. did not clear Hill 232, so the attack on BOVENBERG was postponed, and the 3d Bn. moved up to positions in the south edge of the woods in the vicinity of (995450).

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On 20 November, the 3d Bn. advanced through Bovenberger Wald with K Co. on the ~~right~~ left, L Co. on the right and I Co. in reserve. Heavy casualties were suffered from small arms fire in the advance through the woods. The enemy was dug in well, and advance across the level, wooded terrain was extremely costly. "They just stayed longer without giving up," commented Capt. Mc-his Waters. The enemy tactics coordinated ~~their~~ defense well with defensive artillery preparations, and often he would pull back when threatened with being over-run, only to bring down artillery concentrations when troops tried to exploit their gains. The battalion suffered 70 casualties in Bovenberger Wald, and took positions for the night at (995460).

The plan for 21 November was for the 3d Bn. to proceed northeast through the woods to BOVENBERG in conjunction with the attack of the 16th Inf. on the right and the 1st Bn's attack on Hills 167 and 187. The Bn. jumped off at 0900 on the 21st with I on the left and L Co. on the right. The companies were to continue abreast through the small neck of woods south of BOVENBERG. L's right flank rested on the road which skirted the eastern edge of the Bovenberger Wald. Tanks and TDs proceeded along this road, but did no firing until they reached the crossroads at (001468), because trees blocked their field of fire.

The little neck of woods south of BOVENBERG ^{and the dairy buildings} ~~was~~ the scene of bitter fighting. ^{The woods} ~~It~~ consisted of short, thick pine trees; its area was 50-75 yards square. Small arms and artillery fire met two platoons, coming from all directions to the front and flanks. Because of the heavy walls on the dairy at (998468), the enemy

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could call down artillery upon himself and remain within the building unharmed. As the platoons of L Co. approached closer to the dairy, they were met by grazing fire coming from a series of ground-level slits in the dairy building. The only protection which L Co. had was a series of ~~stair~~ previously dug positions which the Germans had evacuated in order to enter the dairy itself.

Finally, the remaining members of the two platoons-- one to the right and the other echeloned to the left rear-- attempted to assault the dairy building. The platoon on the right actually reached the building but was repulsed by numbers of hand-grenades which the enemy dropped from second-story windows. One squad made a bayonet attack, but only one man survived it. One platoon penetrated to a small patch of woods east of the dairy, and was there cut off by fire and was unable to go either forward or rearward. A heavy smoke screen was thrown to enable the trapped platoon to get out; six men came out unscathed, dragging 15-20 wounded.

As a result of the bitter fighting on ~~20~~ 21 November, L Co. alone lost approximately 35 killed; 2 officers were killed and 2 wounded, leaving Capt. Frazier the only officer left in the company. The weapons platoon, which had dug in at the edge of the woods south of BOVENBERG to prevent a counterattack, was the only group within the company that remained in reasonably good condition. Yet including the weapons platoon, L Co. had a fighting strength of only 37 men at the close of day on 21 November.

On 25 November, it was decided to send K Co. to attack the dairy, with two platoons abreast, and with one platoon and a machine

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gun platoon from M Co. establishing a base of fire. Before advancing on the dairy, artillery fire from 8-inch howitzers was called for, and 26 direct hits were secured on the dairy. When K Co. reached the dairy, it was discovered that the enemy had pulled out; there were no casualties suffered that day.

After a good Thanksgiving Dinner on 25 November, ~~K~~ K Co. moved northeast attached to the 2d Bn. to secure FRENZBURG castle. At 1830 on 26 November, Co. L moved into position from (008484) to (009 479); I Co. established a road block at the junction (004481) with while platoon and the rest of the company went into an assembly area in the vicinity of (002476). Aside from K Co., which was engaged in the assault on the FRENZBURG Castle with the 2d Bn., 47th Inf. (See separate account of this assault), the 3d Bn., 47th Inf. had no further action in this area.

Kenneth W. Hechler
Maj., Inf.

KENNETH W. HECHLER
Maj., Inf. (Armored)

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U.S. Army

: SECRET :
: Authority: CG :
: 1st US Inf Div :
: 1 Dec 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

1 December 1944

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(1 Nov 1944 to 30 Nov 1944)

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6. Photographs of Situation Map.

1. AFTER AACHEN: PREPARATIONS. (1 November to 16 November)

a. During the first days of November the enemy continued the watchful waiting which had characterized his actions since the fall of AACHEN. The units facing the 1st Infantry Division dug and wired themselves in, regrouped and refitted. Artillery falling in the Division area slackened perceptibly. One of the enemy's chief concerns was when and where the next blow would fall, and he sought prisoners constantly.

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b. On 1 November the 3d Battalion, 27th Regiment (12th Division), and elements of the 12th Engineer Battalion, the 246th Fusilier Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 89th Regiment (12th Division), were holding the front opposite the 1st Division. Enemy patrolling was spasmodic and seemed to be directed at taking prisoners; resistance to our patrols was equally unpredictable. In the vicinity of QUINX vigorous defensive fires were put up at any provocation, but in the WURSELER Woods our patrols were able to make deep penetrations without reaction. The enemy positions across the Division front remained constant, with a slight shift eastward of elements of the 12th Division.

c. During this time the G-2 Section, 1st Infantry Division, was preparing an intelligence annex to supplement the next major thrust to the northeast. It included a terrain study, a forecast of weather probabilities for the area and all available notes on order of battle of enemy units likely to appear on the Division front. On 10 November the Division moved to the VICHT and MAUSBACH area for the attack towards the ROER.

2. THE BATTLE OF HAMICH. (16 November to 20 November)

a. The enemy, in meeting the offensive of the 1st US Infantry Division on 16 November, apparently based his maneuver on holding at all costs the open ground on the GRESSENICH-HAMICH-HEISTERN-LANGERWEHE axis. On his left he had about eight kilometers of heavy woods to impede movement eastwards; on his right there was the city of ESCHWEILER to impose the costly delays of street-fighting. The threat, he apparently decided, was straight up the middle. There were, however, advantages to the defense on that line. First, and most important, was Hill 232, a text-book observation post, from which the enemy could look into GRESSENICH to the southwest and WERTH to the west; to the southeast not a field-mouse could get into HAMICH without his knowing it. The hill itself was a position from which he could not be dislodged easily since the crest commanded all the open approaches, and the slopes were creased and scored with quarrying cuts providing defilade from any direction. The face of the hill was covered with low scrub brush and trees which afforded considerable concealment but no interference to fields of fire. HAMICH was well fortified, and the houses were so situated that the enemy could hold one firing position until the heat got too intense and then duck out under cover to reappear at another point. One of the most important factors in the enemy's ability to defend was his control of the road nets. His positions in HAMICH and the heavy forest to the east could be easily supplied. Two roads lead into HAMICH from LANGERWEHE, and so long as he held GRESSENICH our advance on HAMICH could be by infantry only.

b. To back up these natural advantages he had probably more than 200 pieces of artillery, all of which could be laid on any

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particular sector of the front. In infantry he had the 12th Division (see Annex 1), an experienced and skilful outfit from the Russian front which had been depleted in the AACHEN fighting but not to a crippling extent. In addition, he was bringing up another division to relieve the 12th -- the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, newly reformed after the disaster of MONS. Although much of its personnel was inexperienced, it turned out to be the most suicidally stubborn unit this Division has encountered in its campaigns on the continent. In the GRESSENICH Woods, a scarred area of heavy trees and dense underbrush, were elements of the 984th Regiment, dug in behind concertina wire, Riegel mines and well-coordinated final protective lines.

c. In the early morning of 16 November the enemy was engaged in relieving the 12th Division with the 47th Volksgrenadier, an operation which became very hazardous when a prisoner from the relieving unit was captured early in the day and revealed the move. The routes of approach were taken under artillery fire during the morning. Then, at 1115 hours, as the heavy clouds broke, the Air Corps saturated the area with a preparation bombing for the Division offensive. At 1245 hours the 47th US Infantry, attached to the Division for the operation, moved out in the direction of GRESSENICH against the resistance of the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment. The 16th US Infantry got under way at the same time, heading north from SCHEVENHUTTE through the woods toward HAMICH; the 26th US Infantry pushed eastward slowly in the GRESSENICH Woods against the 984th Regiment. It was a slow grind on all sectors; although counter-battery fire by Division artillery with strong Corps support had driven many of the enemy gun crews to cover, enemy mortar fire was intense. The 1st Battalion, 16th US Infantry, was held up at the first draw north of SCHEVENHUTTE down which enemy machine gunners had a clear field of fire. Tanks were brought up from SCHEVENHUTTE to take out the enemy automatic weapons, but as soon as this mission was accomplished they bogged down. The ground conditions were indeed appalling: after two weeks of almost steady rain the mud was deep and clinging, a fact which was taken into full consideration by the enemy artillery. With GRESSENICH still held by the 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry Regiment, the only supply route to the 16th and 26th US Infantry ran through SCHEVENHUTTE. This close canalizing of our traffic was a rewarding target for enemy interdiction fire.

d. Late in the afternoon the 16th US Infantry had advanced with hand-carried weapons to the HAMICH line, where it was held up by small but constant counterattack launched by the 48th Regiment. With GRESSENICH still holding out, although encircled, there was no road up to the advance elements of the 16th US Infantry, and it became increasingly difficult to hold off the enemy with nothing more than infantry weapons.

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e. The HAMICH situation was no more than a hold-off. A heavy enemy counter-attack from the village was turned off by our artillery fire; our troops, equally, were unable to group for an assault on the village because of enemy artillery pouring into the woods south and east of the town on call from observation posts on Hill 232. The 984th Regiment in the GRESSENICH Forest had succeeded in taking the edge off the 26th US Infantry's drive eastward. The prisoner of war count at the end of the day amounted to 48, most of them from the 984th Regiment, although the estimated number of enemy dead ran considerably higher.

f. During the night the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, pulled out of GRESSENICH to HAMICH. Early in the morning 17 November the town of GRESSENICH was forced by the 47th US Infantry against scattered opposition but, as patrols followed up the enemy along the GRESSENICH-HAMICH road, they were forced back by observed artillery fire, again directed from Hill 232, and intense small-arms resistance. It was clear that HAMICH was the enemy's major block. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 16th US Infantry, strung out along the edges of the woods on the perimeter of the village were catching a constant and heavy load of enemy artillery. Small enemy groups from the 2d Battalion, 48th Regiment which attempted to infiltrate into the position were beaten off, but no headway could be made in reducing the town. At 1300 hours another assault on the village, this time supported by a platoon of medium tanks moved forward against little small-arms fire, but was turned back by the enemy artillery. Meanwhile the 2d and 3d Companies of the 984th Regiment had been forced out of their positions along a gully in the GRESSENICH Woods by the 26th US Infantry, and a split had been driven between the flanks of the 12th and 275th Divisions. Enemy casualties, were extremely heavy: fifty prisoners and the company commander were taken from the 3d Company. The original strength of this outfit had been one officer, 16 NCOs and 62 men. Altogether, 114 prisoners were captured during the day.

g. On 18 November HAMICH was finally penetrated when the 3d Battalion, 16th US Infantry, supported by tanks and TDs which had been brought forward, pushed forward and crossed through an enemy barrage area south of the town. By noon the two companies in the assault had reached the road junction in the center of the village; by dark there were still several houses on the northern edge occupied by the enemy. Enemy losses were very high, but the enemy had no intention of permitting our occupation of his critical block without dispute. During the morning five enemy tanks moved down the ridge from the northwest, but were turned back by fighter-bombers and artillery. Later six armored vehicles, tanks and self-propelled guns, hit the town again, moving down the main HAMICH-HEISTERN road. One 75mm assault gun penetrated the village before being stopped and another blew up from a direct hit on the ridge north of the town. Hill 232, that constant thorn, was finally reduced in the afternoon by the 2d Battalion, 16th US Infantry, following an artillery barrage which can best be described as stunning.

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Fifteen battalions were laid on an area no more than 500 yards square and included a high percentage of heavy artillery. When it was over, the 2d Battalion took the hill without a conspicuous struggle. Many prisoners were taken, most of them from the 12th Fusilier Battalion and all of them in a dazed condition. A large number of enemy dead were found on the terrain. The hill, when cleared, looked like a section of the Argonne Forest a quarter of a century ago: trees were snapped off and scarred and the whole area was cratered with heavy shell blasts. It was apparent that the enemy was in the process of increasing the naturally difficult defenses of the hill. Dugouts had been tunnelled into the quarries and other brick and concrete strongpoints were under construction. From prisoners taken on the hill it was learned that the 12th Fusilier Battalion had been moved forward to the HAMICH area to bolster the faltering 48th Regiment. Several artillery forward observers, some of them from a flak group, were included in the bag taken on the hill. With the loss of Hill 232 the enemy lost one of his most effective observation posts, but he was still able to cover the most sensitive points of our front with heavy artillery fire, particularly in the SCHEVENHUTTE and GRESSENICH areas, because of previous registration.

h. On the front of the 26th Infantry, elements of the 115th Regiment, the first unit of the 47th Volksgrenadier Division to be encountered in strength, were identified. This regiment had been moved to the front to cover the disintegration of the 1st Battalion, 984th Regiment under the pressure of our troops. With this encounter a great part of the mist of conjecture about the battle qualities and morale of the Volksgrenadier units was dispelled, and it was plain that if the standard Volksgrenadier Division was to be the equal of the 47th, they will be formidable opponents indeed. (See Annex 2). The 47th Division was formed in Germany in October to take over the somewhat unhappy traditions of the original 47th Infantry Division, buried in the MONS pocket in September. Shortly after activation the new division was sent to Denmark for training and equipping. Nothing was spared in the way of materiel: machine pistols and machine guns were liberally distributed among the rifle companies. The only step backward so far as equipment went, was the substitution of 88mm bazookas for the standard anti-tank guns in the anti-tank companies. The personnel of the new division was also out of the top-drawer, or at least as near the top as the German manpower situation could afford. For the most part the men were from the Navy and Luftwaffe, with about three weeks' infantry training, and about 10% were members of the old 47th Division. The fact that these new recruits from alien branches had had very little infantry experience turned out to be a weakness on paper only; the basic factors of automatic obedience and aggressive action had already been injected into the men, as it is supposed to be in every German who reaches military age under the spell-binding influence of the Nazi regime. In spite of its obvious flaws of organization (lack of transport, for instance) and disparate T/O, the 47th Volksgrenadier Division fulfilled completely its function and mission: "the defense of the Reich, even at the price of annihilation".

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i. With the HAMICH-Hill 232 line lost, and with the enemy resolved to hold every foot of ground he once occupied there was only one course open: to retake the original MLR. This decision was further strengthened by the fact that the next line of defense would have to fall back to HEISTERN, since WENAU was in a deep valley and at the mercy of a thrust along the ridge to the east. Forces for this counterattack were assembled in LANGERWEHE: 15 or 16 Mark V tanks and two depleted companies of the 116th Reconnaissance Battalion which had been fighting further south in the SCHMIDT sector. This force was to be supplemented by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 104th Regiment; the tanks and infantry when assembled north of the line, would jump off together. The tanks were split into two groups; one would support the 2d Battalion's attack on HAMICH, and the other would back up the 1st Battalion in taking Hill 232.

j. As seen from LANGERWEHE, the plan was good. What was not taken in account at LANGERWEHE was the disorganized state of communications -- the result of our artillery fire and the confusion attendant on relieving one division by another during a heavy attack. Furthermore, a replacement lieutenant with no knowledge of the terrain or situation was put in command of one group of tanks to lead it, in the dark and over difficult ground conditions, to an assembly area he had never seen before. This lieutenant, who was later captured, set off with six or seven tanks down the LANGERWEHE-HEISTERN road on his way to the assembly area of the 1st Battalion, 104th Regiment, in the woods north of Hill 232. The rest of the tank force was to follow later and join up with the 2d Battalion in the patch of woods northeast of HAMICH for the assault on the village. Both attacks were to jump off at 0530 hours, 19 November.

k. All went well until the lieutenant leading the first group of tanks (on which the two companies of the 116th Reconnaissance Battalion were riding) made a costly, and in the end, decisive mistake. In HEISTERN instead of continuing straight on down to the road to the right-angle turn which would lead him directly to the 1st Battalion's assembly area, he took the WENAU-HAMICH road which led him right into the positions of "C" Company, 16th US Infantry. Shortly after 2100 hours "C" Company heard the approaching tanks and opened fire. They in turn were attacked by the men of the 116th Reconnaissance Battalion, who swung off the tanks and charged the positions. "C" Company, at this time reduced to 45 men, was hard put to stop the assault. In the meantime, the lieutenant in command of the force, realizing that he was certainly not in the assembly area of the 1st Battalion, 104th Regiment, pulled his tanks together and assembled those men who had not been cut down by "C" Company's defensive fire. He turned the tanks around, loaded his men and started back north. By this time he was hopelessly lost. Apparently, he still thought he was on the main HEISTERN-HAMICH road but had overrun his right hand turn to the 1st Battalion's assembly area. In any case, he started back and took the first road to the left, hoping to correct his error. This turn, however, was a small track through the woods which eventually brought him out on the main road leading directly into HAMICH. Again he found

himself in hot water: outposts of the 3d Battalion, 16th US Infantry, which was holding the town, picked up the tanks, and called down artillery. Fifteen battalions were laid on the road and open area north of the town, and the results were disastrous. The enemy infantry and tank guides were cleaned out; those who were not killed outright took off to the north. Several of the tanks, however, continued forward down the main street. One was knocked out by a bazooka man who leaned out of a second-story window and sent a round through the turret from above. The fighting was bitter and costly; at one time our infantry holed up in the cellars of the houses they held to allow our artillery to rake the area with "time" fire and super-quick fuze. Working in the dark and in the narrow confines of the village the tanks were at a disadvantage. Eventually, they pulled out to the northern edge of the village where the enemy still held a couple of houses and a dairy barn. In turning around two more tanks were lost by accident: feeling their way without guides in the dark both fell into tremendous craters left by the bombing of the day before.

l. In the assembly area north of Hill 232, the 1st Battalion, 104th Regiment was still waiting for the lost lieutenant and his tanks before starting the counterattack. The tanks, of course, never arrived, but our artillery took the area under fire. At 0530 hours, 19 November, the first and second companies attacked anyway. (The third company had been scattered by our artillery.) As the two companies approached the hill from the north they were met by heavy concentrated fire put up by the 2d Battalion, 16th US Infantry. As an officer prisoner said later, the heavy machine guns were excellently sited and did a thorough job in destroying the attack. Of the 1st Company, 66 strong at the opening of the assault, only the commanding officer got through unscathed, and he is reported to have had eight bullet holes through his overcoat and two through his handkerchief incurred when he stopped to blow his nose.

m. Back in the HAMICH area, elements of the 2d Battalion, 104th Regiment, had received their allotment of tanks on schedule, and before daylight they started to infiltrate towards the town. The fighting was again close-in and violent but bazooka and TD fire forced the tanks back out and the enemy infantry was gradually driven back after them. In pulling back along the HISTERN road two more tanks were destroyed by our artillery.

n. The suicidal outcome of this series of attacks to regain the HAMICH and Hill 232 line pointed up both the enemy's determination to hold the ground he occupied at the time, even with inevitable crippling losses, and his desperate groping for sufficient forces to accomplish the mission. Certainly not even the most optimistic German commander could have imagined that two under-strength companies with no support would be able to drive even an equal force, much less a battalion, off a terrain feature as defendable a Hill as 232. Some indication of the extent of the losses incurred by the enemy's refusal to give ground can be had from the fact that of the two companies of the 116th Reconnaissance Battalion

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which inadvertently turned into HAMICH during the night, only one prisoner, the lieutenant in command, was taken; the rest were cut down by the shattering 5000 round artillery concentration. Of the 1st Company, 104th Regiment, which tried to retake Hill 232, only 13 men remained -- 12 who had the good fortune to be with the company trains in the rear, and the one lieutenant taken prisoner. Losses in the 48th Regiment were correspondingly high, and the 12th Fusilier Battalion as a unit was ready for retirement from the war. The fighting through 19 November completed the capture of the enemy MLR, chewed up the better part of eight battalions of infantry and knocked out five Mark V tanks, two self-propelled assault guns and a considerable amount of other tracked and armored equipment.

o. On the western sector of the Division front, elements of the 2d Battalion, 103d Regiment, had been forced off the southern slope of Hill 187, about 1000 yards east-northeast of VOLKENRATH, by the 47th US Infantry. The rest of the 2d Battalion, contained on the south and the west by the 3d Armored Division and now attacked from the rear by the 47th Infantry, gave up the fight and surrendered. On the eastern sector, the 26th Infantry, still grinding forward in sodden, difficult woods under constant and intense artillery fire, managed to seize the crossroads 1000 yards southeast of WENAU. Shortly after noon the 2d Battalion, less the 7th Company, of the 115th Regiment, counterattacked but was driven off after heavy close-in fighting. Enemy losses to our artillery and small-arms fire were again very serious.

3. HEISTERN and LANGERWEHE. (20 November to 27 November)

a. With his most important MLR cracked at HAMICH and Hill 232, the enemy withdrew slowly, contesting every village, built-up area and terrain feature on the way. His casualties were crippling and to replace them he drew on every available man in the area. Service troops from the rear areas, engineers, veterinaries and artillerymen were thrown in as infantry. Separate companies and battalions, such as the guard company from the 81st Corps headquarters and the guard battalion from 15th Army headquarters appeared on the front. There was no such thing as a rear-echelon soldier behind the German lines; every man able to walk and bear arms was pushed forward to halt our advance. In the end, however, the enemy was only successful in delaying the commitment of a major unit from his carefully hoarded reserves; he was unable to stop the Division advance with the troops he had at hand. Yet in a situation where morale might be expected to be very feeble, this patch-work collection of troops fought bitterly and tenaciously.

b. The terrain most suited to the enemy's defense was on the eastern flank of the Division in the GRESSENICH and WENAU Woods. In spite of the heavy forest and wet, soggy ground, the 26th US Infantry pushed out a force to take SCHLOSS LAUFENBURG, a castle strongly defended by elements of the 115th Regiment. To the west, WENAU fell on 19 November to "I" Company, 18th US Infantry. It

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was not seriously contested, but its capture left a rear-guard pocket of the 1st Battalion, 115th Regiment in the woods to the southeast. (The rest of the battalion had pulled out to MERODE.) These men resisted the 26th Infantry all day, but were eventually almost completely wiped out. The remnants of the 2d Battalion, 104th Regiment, had pulled back from its attack on HAMICH and had taken up defensive positions in HEISTERN. The 1st Battalion, 104th Regiment, or what was left of it after the counterattack on Hill 232, moved north in the direction of NOTHBERG.

c. During the night of 19-20 November, the 147th Engineer Battalion, 47th Volksgrenadier Division, was moved into position between the 103 and 104th Regiments to prop up the sagging line, and approximately 200 replacements were brought up from the rear. The main part of their replacements went to the 104th Regiment which was hard pressed to find sufficient forces to defend HEISTERN. In spite of these reinforcements the enemy was pushed back to within 1000 yards of BOVENBERG on the west in heavy, close-quarter fighting. The heaviest fighting, however, occurred when the 18th US Infantry forced the enemy's defenses at HEISTERN on 20 November. In defending the village the enemy had again employed the same methods as at HAMICH: hasty field fortifications along the edge of the build-up area, backed by individual strongpoints in the houses and the whole forward area covered by as heavy an artillery concentration as he could muster, which was considerable. He did not, however, hold the same advantages of terrain as at HAMICH, and our forces were able to break into the town after hard fighting both in the outskirts and along the main streets. By nightfall the 18th US Infantry had established a road block on the main road junction in the town. The enemy held on to his half of the village, tenaciously resisting every further advance with small arms and grenades. To the east another force of the 18th US Infantry had by-passed HEISTERN and moved to within 300 yards of SCHONTHAL under severe mortar and artillery fire.

d. During the night of 20-21 November the enemy brought up reinforcements to the 2d Battalion, 104th Regiment in the north end of HEISTERN. Col. JOSEF KIMBACHER, commanding the 104th Regiment, led these supporting troops, which consisted of the 104th Regimental Headquarters Company and 104th Training Company, into the town personally to take over direction of the counterattack. At 0330 hours, 21 November, this force launched the attack to drive the 18th US Infantry from HEISTERN. The attack was preceded by an artillery and mortar barrage and was driven home hard, probably accelerated by the presence of Col. KIMBACHER. But in spite of the support of several self-propelled guns, the assault was beaten off shortly before daylight. Col. KIMBACHER was taken prisoner in an aid station, conspicuously marked with a red cross, from which he had directed the attack. About 120 other prisoners were also taken, and after dawn our troops were able to advance and clean out the rest of HEISTERN and move 500 yards up the road toward LANGERWEHE.

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e. To the west elements of the 1st Battalion, 103d Regiment resisted every attempt of the 47th US Infantry to drive them off of Hill 187, about 1000 yards north of SCHERPENSEEL. From the crest of the hill the enemy had observation over NOTHBERG, VOLKENRATH, and the area of the 3d Armored Division which was pushing up toward ESCHWEILER. From it he was also able to direct the heavy artillery concentrations which prevented a successful assault by the 47th US Infantry. In the afternoon of 21 November, our troops withdrew and saturated the rise with an intense heavy artillery concentration. The enemy's casualties were severe, but at the end of the day he was still clinging to the top of the hill. Fighting in the whole area was heavy and costly. Our troops advancing north in the BOVENBERG Woods were met by heavy fire from the hills east of NOTHBERG and were forced to stop and dig in.

f. On the eastern part of the front, the elements of the 26th US Infantry which had succeeded in seizing the castle LAUFENBURG were heavily counterattacked by the 2d Battalion, 115th Regiment. This unit had been pulled out of the WENAU Woods, reassembled in MERODE, and moved to an area north of the castle. The 1st Battalion, 115th Regiment, reinforced by the addition of 40 replacements from the 47th Division Veterinary Company held Crossroads 254, 1000 yards east of the castle, and our troops were able to move up to this position after beating off the counterattack on the castle.

g. On 25 November the three critical areas across the division front were in the vicinity of Hill 187 on the left, the high ground south of the bend of the railroad between NOTHBERG and LANGERWEHE in the center and Hill 203, 1000 yards southwest of LANGERWEHE on the right. The enemy resisted stubbornly at all these points, and their reduction was a slow and bitter procedure. Across the edge of the woods south of the high ground in the bend of the railroad, the 47th Fusilier Company had been put in the line to bar our approach to the castle on the crest, which was the commanding feature of the terrain. Early in the morning of 23 November the 47th Fusilier Company was almost entirely destroyed in an attack by the 16th US Infantry which passed around the company's left flank and attacked it from the rear. The commanding officer and 48 men were captured and a large number of enemy dead were left on the position. Moving on, the 16th US Infantry pushed north to the castle, only to be forced to a halt by intense artillery and mortar fire. Taking a leaf from our defense of HAMICH during the tank and infantry counterattack of the 104th Regiment, the German artillery observer had pulled his troops back into the cellar of the castle and called down fire on his position. The castle was held by Battle Group EISENHUBER, a mixed collection of remnants of the 47th Volksgrenadier Division. After our attack had been halted, the Battle Group launched a counterattack, but with no success and heavy casualties. Our forces again assembled and hit the castle, this time taking it, but at 2140 hours, Battle Group EISENHUBER, which was nothing if not stubborn, tried another attack to drive the 16th US Infantry

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out. This thrust was supported by several tanks and 100 infantry, and was launched from the northeast. It was broken down by artillery fire, and three tanks were knocked out.

h. Meanwhile, the enemy had managed to reinforce his position at SCHONTHAL with a new company -- the guard company for the 81st German Corps. This company was added to the elements of the 104th already in the SCHONTHAL area; to the north, the base position of Hill 203 was held by other elements of the 104th Regiment and parts of the 147th Engineer Battalion. Both these points were pressed by the 18th US Infantry, but at the close of 23 November, neither had been taken.

i. On 24 November SCHONTHAL was finally over-run by our troops and the hill northeast of the hamlet was cleared of the enemy. Hill 203 continued to hold out, however, and in the afternoon a powerful counterattack directed from LANGERWEHE and covered by a heavy mortar and artillery barrage hit the 18th US Infantry and retook the high ground to the north of SCHONTHAL. This attacking force was the 15th Assault Battalion, a heavily equipped unit whose original function was to guard the headquarters of the 15th German Army. Although bitter fighting continued about Hill 203, the position was not finally cleared until 27 November; although both the enemy troops and ours were on the hill, neither could drive the other off and the fighting rocked back and forth constantly.

j. During 23 November, the enemy continued his attempts to retake the castle held by the 16th US Infantry, and at times had entered our positions before being driven out. Other elements of the 16th US Infantry, however, pushed up north to within 300 yards of the railroad tracks. Resistance to this move was put up by the 1st Battalion, 89th Regiment, a unit which had not been encountered since the opening of the offensive. To the left the 47th US Infantry, attempting to thrust eastward between the two railroad tracks encountered heavy anti-tank fire and artillery, and was stopped. The next day, however, the advance was continued against strong fire directed from WILHELMSLOHE and fortified points to the east. Nearly 200 prisoners were taken in the fierce fighting, and after WILHELMSLOHE was taken, the fire impeding the progress of the 16th US Infantry diminished and allowed the combat team to exploit the penetration to the railroad tracks.

k. Meanwhile Hill 203 continued to hold out. The elements of the 104th Regiment and 147 Engineer Battalion which were defending the position were suffering heavy casualties but refused to retreat. On 27 November the main body of the enemy on the hill was forced back, but a group of about 50 or 60 men, reinforced with excellently sited automatic weapons, managed to retain control of the reverse slope. Further north along the railroad track, the sweep east by the 47th US Infantry, aided now by the 16th US Infantry which had moved up to the tracks continued. FRENZBURG, 2000 yards northwest of LANGERWEHE and the next enemy strongpoint,

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was hit by a heavy artillery barrage after putting up an effective resistance to our infantry.

l. On 27 November the enemy position defending LANGERWEHE and the open ground west of DUREN broke. During the night of 26-27 November the enemy had brought in his first major unit from his hoarded reserves -- the 3d Parachute Division. Most of the troops were very young boys, 16 to 19 who were in combat for the first time. They had been drafted from the Luftwaffe for the most part, to refurnish the 3d Parachute Division, which had been ground down almost to extinction in the Normandy fighting. The division had been refitted in Germany and sent to ENSCHEDE, Holland, for training in the first days of September. The division was sent to the LANGERWEHE front on 23-25 November when it became evident that the American drive could not be stopped with the units already in the area. The parachutists arrived at an inopportune moment, for again the German command tried to stage a relief of troops during a heavy attack, and in the end lost the LANGERWEHR-JUNGERSDORF position, which might well have held out stubbornly if it had been previously reinforced.

m. On the night of 26 November the enemy situation was not promising. FRENZERBURG Castle, between the Military Highway and the railroad tracks, was still holding out, but it was dominated by the fire of troops of the 47th US Infantry. Other units of the regiment had moved directly south and taken the rough ground just north of the ESCHWEILER-LANGERWEHE road. Elements of the 16th US Infantry were on the high ground just southeast of GUT MERBERICH and looking down at the buildings. A determined battle group was still denying the 18th US Infantry the use of Hill 203 from well dug positions on the reverse slope. The one element of this situation not known to the enemy was the fact that the pitted ground north of the road was held by our forces.

n. With the arrival of the 3d Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment in LANGERWEHE, the enemy decided to reinforce his positions on Hill 203 and in GUT MERBERICH. A third force, made up of elements of the 103d Regiment was sent out to restore the situation in FRENZERBURG Castle. This last group planned to move into the rough ground (already held by the 47th US Infantry) north of the road and attack the castle from the south. A supporting force of assault guns would come up from the east and take the castle under fire. As the enemy troops started to move into the assembly position before dawn 27 November, they were taken under fire by the 47th US Infantry and decimated. Those who escaped filtered back toward LANGERWEHE, and a few remained to make abortive thrusts against the castle during the day. The major attack, however, was cut off before it started. Meanwhile the young parachutists, full of high spirits and Nazi ideology, moved on to GUT MERBERICH. They had no more than reached the buildings when the artillery concentration which was to soften up the area for the attack of the 16th US Infantry, hit the GUT.

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The parachutists, who had never been under fire before, ran for the cellars and were still there when the advance elements of the 26th US Infantry, following up the barrage, forced the buildings. At least 75 prisoners were taken (see Annex 3). To the north, the garrison of the FRENZBURG Castle, unrelieved and not reinforced, was surrounded by the 47th US Infantry.

o. To the east the force of parachutists sent to relieve the battle group holding Hill 203 reached the positions just before the final assault of the 18th US Infantry, timed to coincide with that of the 16th US Infantry, pushed over the crest and overran the defenses. These parachutists, like their comrades at the GUT, had been overwhelmed by the force of our preliminary artillery concentration and surrendered in equal quantities. With this momentum the 18th US Infantry moved on to LANGERWEHE, cleaning out the woods to the east of the road on the way. Here more remnants of the 15th Assault Battalion were encountered, as well as rear elements of the 2d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment which had moved to MERODE. By nightfall LANGERWEHE had been entered and was in the process of being cleared.

4. JUNGERSDORF AND MERODE. (27 November to 1 December)

a. At 1500 hours the 3d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, which was holding JUNGERSDORF, was pushed out by the 3d Battalion, 26th US Infantry, after hard and heavy fighting. To the south, other elements of the 26th US Infantry, still working through the woods over a primitive and difficult road network, approached the enemy positions in MERODE. The line was gradually being straightened out on a north-south axis, with all the villages on the line in our hands. The position was improved when the resistance in STUTGERLOCH was overcome on 28 November. On the same day the FRENZBURG Castle, which had been surrounded by the 47th US Infantry, was taken, eliminating the last enemy pocket to the west of LANGERWEHE. More than 40 enemy dead were counted in the castle, but the main body of the defenders had escaped by a secret passage after refusing an ultimatum to surrender. The withdrawal was effected the night of 27 November under cover of assault guns which moved up and shelled our positions.

b. On the Division's right flank, the enemy positions at MERODE were breached by elements of the 2d Battalion, 26th US Infantry, which finally emerged from the woods and pushed two companies into the town. Resistance from the 2d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment was stubborn at first, but collapsed under pressure, or possibly on direct orders. At any rate "E" and "F" Companies, 26th US Infantry, moved into the town and took up positions along the western edge. Again it was entirely an infantryman's fight. MERODE was unapproachable from the Division side by any heavy vehicles or supporting weapons, while the enemy had an excellent supply net leading into the village, and he made the most of the situation. During the night of 29 November, the 2d Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, which had withdrawn from the town, counterattacked with

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powerful artillery support and with assault guns. The one track which led into the village from the Division side of the lines was taken under intense artillery fire, and it was impossible to move up support weapons or reinforcements through the mud; a burned-out tank lying directly across the road further impeded any relief. The two companies in the town stood their ground, but cut off from the rear and attacked frontally by the 2d Battalion parachutists, they were hard-pressed. Communication with the companies did not exist and it was impossible to lay effective artillery fire on the attackers for lack of reported observation. During the day of 30 November the isolated companies continued to hold out in their part of the village, but at last light 30 November the 1st Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, which had been in reserve in the DUREN area was hurriedly moved to the front and sent in from the north as a block behind the two companies; the cut, then, was complete. Prisoners taken later said that they had heard that the remnants of "E" and "F" Companies, 26th US Infantry, had been captured on 1 December when their ammunition was gone.

5. CONCLUSION.

a. There is no doubt that enemy resistance to the First US Infantry Division offensive of 16 November, was as tenacious and determined as any encountered in the Division's campaigns. By virtue of his stubborn reluctance to give up so much as a foot of defensible ground, the enemy was able to inflict a considerable number of casualties on our troops. In this he was aided by a terrain which was as unrelenting as the enemy himself. The deep woods through which the 26th US Infantry forced its way precluded the use of any support weapons except those which could be carried through the mud and underbrush on a man's back. Enemy mortar and artillery fire, even heavier during this offensive than the concentrations laid on the VERLAUTENHEIDE Ridge in the battle for AACHEN, was increased in effectiveness by the high percentage of tree bursts obtained in the woods. Furthermore, the enemy was retreating over terrain which he knew intimately, and on which he had registered his artillery. At the close of the period it was estimated that the enemy artillery was equal in number to our own, the first time that such an unadvantageous ratio had prevailed.

b. The morale of the enemy troops, by all previous experience, should have been shaky. It was not. Small groups, surrounded and cut off, refused to surrender. If the German command often sent suicidally small forces to perform what should have been battalion or even regimental missions, at least those forces fought until they were exterminated. Never before has the First Division encountered an enemy regimental commander personally directing local counterattacks, yet it happened during this operation, when the colonel commanding the 104th Regiment was captured fighting an isolated and essentially hopeless engagement.

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c. The enemy's stubbornness, however, resulted in disastrous casualties. It is estimated that at least a battalion of infantry a day was destroyed in the fighting around HAMICH, Hill 232, Hill 187 and Hill 203. Of forty-one officers in the 104th Regiment, 23 were killed, wounded or captured by 22 November. (See Annex 4). Over 3,000 prisoners were taken, and it can be said that two divisions, the 47th Volksgrenadier and 12th Infantry Divisions were destroyed. (See Annex 5).

Robert F. Evans

ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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ANNEX 1 to Monthly Intelligence Activities Report (November 1944 Headquarters
1st US Inf Div)

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U.S. ARMY

: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Authority: CG :
: 1st US Inf Div :
: 23 Nov 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

23 November 1944

CAPTURED COMMENDATION OF 12TH INFANTRY DIVISION

12th Infantry Division
The Commanding General

Division CP
5 November 1944

Men of the 12th Infantry Division:

The Fuhrer has granted this division the honorary title of VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION, to be effective immediately. The Fuhrer wants to express thanks and admiration through this personal order to the Division for the extraordinary fighting qualities and accomplishments while the unit was in line in the West. The citation reads as follows:

The name VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION will only be given to units with battle experience or to units composed of young men now forming into a new series of divisions.

The Volksgrenadier Divisions will be, together with the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions, the Elite of our Army.

The Volksgrenadiers will receive young men exclusively as their personnel.

The Volksgrenadier Divisions will be personally administered by the Reichsfuhrer SS.

The number of Volksgrenadier Divisions will be limited. The change of designation of this active division ordered by the Fuhrer is effective immediately. At this time only the 12th Infantry Division and one other active Division have been so honored.

Men of the 12th Infantry Division!

We are proud that the Fuhrer has singled us out for such an honor. Just as we have upheld our proud history we shall know how to conduct ourselves in the future. With pride and joy we learn that the excellent reputation of our division has reached echelons as high as the War Department. We pledge to uphold this honor in the future!

Hail the Fuhrer.

s/ ENGEL

s/ Robert F. Evans,
t/ ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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ANNEX 2 to Monthly Intelligence Activities Report (November 1944 Headquarters
1st US Inf Div)

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U. S. Army

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: Authority: CG:
: 1st US Inf Div:
: 22 Nov 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

22 November 1944

CAPTURED ORDER OF 47TH VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

47th Volksgrenadier Division
The Commanding General.

Division CP
7 November 1944

To all unit-commanders of the
47th Volksgrenadier Division:

The division is going into action for the first time. At this time I want to impress upon every officer, non-commissioned officer and enlisted man that our Fuhrer and the whole German people have utmost confidence in the Volksgrenadier. All our strength belongs to the battle for the destiny of our people.

However, combat does not terminate training. As soon as the troops arrive in line, training schedules are to be carried out by day and night.

A prepared position is never finished. Even headquarters personnel and supply troops are to work every day on the improvement of positions. The daily duty of all troops will include four hours of digging.

A retreat from prepared positions will take place only on explicit and confirmed orders. Responsible officers and non-commissioned officers of strongpoints will be sworn in by the battalion commander to defend their positions to the last breath.

Local reserves will go into action immediately to counteract local penetrations of the enemy. The battalion counterattack will be led by the Battalion Commander personally.

All guns will fire to the last shell, and once the last shell is expended the gun crews will fight as infantry. Only when there is no longer ammunition for the infantry weapons will an order be given to destroy the gun. Even if such an order is given an investigation to determine if it was necessary will be conducted. If it is found that the order was not absolutely required, appropriate action will be taken against the responsible persons.

Prime movers and transportation for the batteries and anti-tank guns will be held in readiness, and dug in when necessary.

Captain VERSCHWELE, commanding officer of the 147th anti-tank battalion, is appointed special officer for anti-tank warfare. He has my authority to supervise the anti-tank security of the entire division (including the artillery regiment) and to make appropriate recommendations to me and the regimental commanders.

Signature illegible.

Generalleutnant (US: Major General)

s/ Robert F. Evans,
t/ ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U. S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U. S. Army

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: Authority: CG:
: 1st US Inf Div:
: 27 Nov 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

27 November 1944

INTERROGATION REPORT ON PERSONNEL, 3D PARA DIVISION

1. The first representatives of the enemy's stack of hoarded main reserves appeared in the Division cage during the period when 34 prisoners from the 9th Parachute Regiment (3d Parachute Division) were processed. A glance at the prisoners, however, showed that the unit has changed considerably since it faced the First Infantry Division in the vicinity of CAUMONT in July. Most of the prisoners, with the exception of the non-commissioned officers, are 17; a fair number are only 16. Only a few have started to smoke and one razor would satisfy all the prisoners. The uniforms of the prisoners were of the same quality as the original stubborn veterans of Normandy, but the weapons of the unit have been down-graded to the level of a normal infantry division: machine pistols for the officers and non-commissioned officers only, and bolt-action rifles for the privates. One or two of the non-commissioned officers had seen action in France but not one private had been in combat before. The prisoners said, however, that in reorganizing the regiment 30 men with combat experience had been put in each company of 140 men. Apparently the veterans were experienced enough to avoid capture. Most of the privates had been drafted in Germany in the last six months; one in fact was conscripted in August. All of the recent recruits were former members of the Hitler Jugend, and as such, overflowing with love for the fatherland, though not necessarily for the Nazi Party. The interrogator asked one of them, "Did your parents give you their permission to join up and fight for Germany?" "No, I was drafted," the prisoner said.

2. The third battalion of the 9th Regiment left ENSCHEDE, Holland, on the German side of the Rhine, where it had been training, on 21 November. It arrived in GEMUND (1220) in the afternoon of 25 November and marched to MERKEN, via ZULPICH, DUREN and BIRKSDORF, that night. After a day's stop-over in MERKEN the battalion marched to LANGERWEHE at night, and was committed, with the mission of relieving what was left of the 103d Regiment in the line west of the town. At one point during this operation, both the relieving and relieved forces were captured by our troops. Holding the line in the vicinity of GUT MARBERICH was a lieutenant and 18 men (he had had 90 when he went into the line) and as the relieving paratroops came up, as did troops of the 18th Infantry.

3. Prisoners from the parachute battalion said that no artillery had accompanied them on their trip from Holland. They knew nothing of the other battalions of the regiment, nor of the other regiments of the division. Commanding officer of the 3d Battalion is Capt BUCHOLZ; the regimental commander is Col HOFFMAN.

4. Another prisoner was Lt MUTHANN, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment. The battalion was sent to MERODE after reorganization at SINDORF (2557) and was attacked by our airforce two days ago with heavy casualties. The battalion, which only consisted of 129 men, 27 non-commissioned officers and four officers originally, was then sent into the line southeast of JUNGERSDORF.

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By yesterday only 70 men remained, but even with this depleted force, Lt MUTMANN was ordered by his regimental commander to take the high ground to his front. Our infantry's fire was lethal, and when the regimental commander ordered another attack later, only nine men were in condition to go. Lt MUTMANN appealed for help from the regiment but got nothing but another order to attack. In a burst of temper, the Lieutenant left his positions and walked over to our side.

5. The prisoner said that two defense lines have been prepared west of the ROER. The first line was constructed too close to the river itself and is at present mainly untenable because high water has flooded most of the positions. The second, and main line, runs from MERZENICH to ELLEN (1251) to HAMBACH (0956).

6. The prisoner, who is still angry with his regimental commander, told the interrogator that "Germany can blow up tomorrow for all of me". He also said that Field Marshal MODEL visited the 81st Corps Headquarters at NIEDERZIER (1054) six days ago and told the commanding general of the 12th Division, ENGELS, that the present line must be held for seven days, and at the end of which time parachute and SS units would be committed in the line. Today was the seventh day, and it marked the arrival of the 3d Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment. No SS formations were reported on the Division front during the period.

s/ Robert F. Evans,
t/ ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

ANNEX 5 to Monthly Intelligence Activities Report (November 1944 Headquarters
1st US Inf Div)

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U.S. Army

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: Authority: CG:
: 1st US Inf Div:
: 24 Nov 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

24 November 1944

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 47 VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

The 47 Infantry Division was originally stationed in the CALAIS area where it was formed in March 1943. From there it was sent to defend PARIS; it arrived too late. Then it was given the job of fighting a delaying action east of the SEINE and was buried in the MONS pocket. The Division Commanding General, Major General WAHLE, was captured by the First Infantry Division and the remnants of the Division were sent to DENMARK for reorganization. The new 47 Volksgrenadier Division was designed to rectify the bad reputation of its former namesake. The new division included no foreigners and no grandfathers; it was offered the cream of the crop of the German youth. GOERING contributed a quota of excellent men, even trained pilots, and DOENITZ sent along a large group of trained Navy men. The majority of the officers and non-commissioned officers were drawn from the ranks of experienced Russia fighters. The Division received new equipment and the most modern weapons in large quantities.

The troubles of the new division started shortly after it left DENMARK on 10 November. Danish patriots dynamited the railroad lines at two places, and the division was held up for a day. Nor did the advance detail of the division, which had been sent forward previously, fare any better. The majority of its personnel was captured while surveying the positions of the 12 Infantry Division which they were to relieve. The main body of the division arrived on 15 November, the day before our offensive. The 2d Battalion, 104 Regiment, for instance, detrained at JULICH at 1000, 16 November; two hours later, the railroad station did not exist. The 1st Battalion, 104 Regiment detrained at ELSDORF during our air attack on 16 November; fortunately for them, our bombs missed their objectives. On the other hand, the 3d Battalion of the 147 Artillery Regiment was misdirected to JULICH, and it arrived just in time for our Air Corps reception. As a result, the 3d Battalion will not see much action in this campaign. The original plan called for the 47 Volksgrenadier Division to relieve the 12 Infantry Division on 16 November. This was impossible due to our heavy attack and concentrated artillery fire. Then came a series of conflicting orders. One battalion was ordered to occupy a position in a certain sector; 3 hours later, when the battalion was well on its way, it was recalled and ordered to attack in a different sector. The regimental commanding officers gave out one set of orders; the division commanding officer gave others, and Corps had its own ideas. In the meantime, in good weather our air force was having a field day, and our artillery was making good use of its ammunition. On 18 November, orders to relieve the 12 Division were issued again and carried out amidst great confusion. As our troops overran the German line the units of the Volksgrenadier Division were unable to occupy fixed prepared positions, but found themselves in a sector which they had not had time to reconnoiter. The 1st Battalion, 104 Regiment found its nemesis on Hill 232. The Germans advanced to within 25-50 yards of our

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positions before fire was opened. Practically the entire 1st Battalion was wiped out within minutes, and the dead almost exceeded the number of prisoners of war taken. The 2d Battalion, 103 Regiment met an almost similar fate at SCHERPENSEEL and to add insult to injury, the German artillery fired into their own lines there. Communications to the rear were disrupted; regimental commanders did not know where their battalions were and vice versa. The artillery forward observers never located their own infantry, and in addition, their guns were reluctant to fire on account of the constant vigil of our air force.

First Lieutenant SCHUTKOWSKI, commander of 4th Company, 104 Regiment, said: "Not even during our worst crisis in RUSSIA did I experience such utter confusion and such drastic failures on the part of responsible German commanders." First Lieutenant BERGBOLD, commander of 1st Company, 104 Regiment, said: "It was all mixed up; I did not know what was going on on my right or left nor did I know what was in front of me, but still I was ordered to attack." Lieutenant LUMEN from 2d Battalion Headquarters, 104 Regiment, said: "You shot more artillery ammunition than we expended rifle ammunition." All prisoners had high praise for our artillery; they claim it to be most accurate and effective. The first few prisoners from the division were arrogant and firm believers in the GOEBBELS propaganda, but after two days of fighting even the old experienced soldiers were glad to be in American captivity. M/Sgt Rudolf FOEHRS of the 7th Company, 103 Regiment, a professional soldier with 10 years of service, observed: "Ours was a good division; it had the best personnel and the best of equipment. Had it been sent to a quieter sector in the beginning and put into battle gradually, it would have been a formidable outfit. Now we are finished".

(Adapted from First US Army)

s/ Robert F. Evans,
t/ ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 1, U.S. Army

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: Authority: CG :
: 1st US Inf Div :
: 21 Nov 1944 :
: Initials: RFE :

21 November 1944

CAPTURED ROSTER

The following roster of officers of the 104 Regiment, 47 Volksgrenadier Division, was captured by the First Infantry Division on 20 November. The column, "Present Status" was taken from the records of the prisoner of war cage, the medical collecting companies, and testimony of prisoners. Contact with the 104 Regiment was first made on 17 November. This list was compiled four days later.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PRESENT STATUS</u>
JOSEF KIMBACHER	Lt. Col.	CO, Regt.	WIA - PW
ADOLF SCHMIEDL	2nd Lt.	Regt. Staff	
KARL FRITZ	2nd Lt.	Regt. Staff	
HANS-ULRICH LEMKE	Staff Vet.	Regt. Staff	
HEINRICH BURGHARDT	Adjutant	Regt. Staff	PW
KARL JUNGHEIM	1st Lt.	Regt. Staff	
FRITZ MOBIUS	2nd Lt.	Regt. Staff	
ROLF HAUPT	1st Lt.	Hq. Co.	
OTTO WUSTER	Capt.	1st Bn. Staff	KIA
WILHELM SCHRODER	Med. O.	1st Bn. Staff	
ARTHUR BERKE	Paymaster	1st Bn. Staff	
ARTUR STREIBERT	2nd Lt.	1st Bn. Staff	
FRIEDRICH DODES	2nd Lt.	1st Bn. Staff	KIA
WALRAB von BUTTLAR	Capt.	2nd Bn. Staff	PW
HEINZ BRUNNEMANN	2nd Lt.	2nd Bn. Staff	PW
WALTER NIEBERGALL	2nd Lt.	2nd Bn. Staff	WIA
ERNST MAYR	Med. O.	2nd Bn. Staff	WIA
WALTER TWISTEL	Paymaster	2nd Bn. Staff	
FRITZ BERGBOLD	1st Lt.	1st Co.	PW
FRITZ HEINRICH	2nd Lt.	1st Co.	
HORST RADISCH	2nd Lt.	2nd Co.	
ERWIN LUMEN	2nd Lt.	2nd Co.	KIA
FRITZ HOFMANN	2nd Lt.	3rd Co.	
KARL ECKHARDT	2nd Lt.	3rd Co.	
WERNER SCHUTKOWSKI	1st Lt.	4th Co.	PW
HANS SCHOLZ	2nd Lt.	4th Co.	
FERDINAND WURM	2nd Lt.	4th Co.	KIA
RICHARD VOLMER	2nd Lt.	5th Co.	WIA - PW
WILHELM WILKENLOH	1st Lt.	5th Co.	WIA
SIEGFRIED ZINK	2nd Lt.	6th Co.	PW
ARTUR FENNER	1st Lt.	6th Co.	WIA
HUGO KOPPL	1st Lt.	7th Co.	WIA - PW
KONRAD von HOBE	2nd Lt.	7th Co.	WIA
OSKAR GOFEL	2nd Lt.	8th Co.	KIA

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PRESENT STATUS</u>
RICHARD GEORGE	2nd Lt.	8th Co.	WIA
KARL-HEINZ STEINMANN	1st Lt.	8th Co.	
ERNST MULLER	Capt	13th Co.	
HANS HENTRICH	2nd Lt.	13th Co.	Sick
OTTO ROMER	2nd Lt.	13th Co.	WIA - PW
WILHELM LUDWIG	2nd Lt.	14th Co.	
HORST JLLGEN	2nd Lt.	14th Co.	WIA

s/ Robert F. Evans,
t/ ROBERT F. EVANS,
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-2.

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